The Oxide control plane is affected by two vulnerabilities in the libraries it uses to validate SAML responses. An unauthenticated attacker who can reach the external API can send a crafted SAML response to any silo configured for SAML authentication and:
crash the control plane, and potentially execute arbitrary code (CVE-2025-7424 in libxslt), or
cause the control plane to send HTTP GET requests to arbitrary addresses, including services reachable only from inside the rack.
Oxide recommends that all customers using SAML for authentication upgrade immediately.
| Revision | Date (YYYYMMDD) | Changes |
|---|---|---|
1.0 | 20261009 | Initial Release |
Impact
An unauthenticated user with access to the external facing API on an Oxide rack
with SAML authentication enabled who can reach /,
will be able to:
Perform Denial of Service and possibly execute code (CVE-2025-7424)
An unauthenticated user can crash the control plane with a request and can repeat the request indefinitely to keep the control plane unavailable. This vulnerability can also allow for reading and corrupting memory. Oxide has not identified a workable code execution chain at this time, but one cannot be ruled out.
Trigger Server-side request forgery (libxml2)
An attacker can cause the control plane to send HTTP GET requests to arbitrary addresses
of the attacker’s choosing. This includes the internal rack network services,
not otherwise reachable from outside the rack. A separate build defect
in libxml2 causes most of these requests to fail, but the attacker can retry
indefinitely. The attacker does not receive a response.
Action Required
Update to Oxide software version 23.1 or 22.2 following our update procedure. Systems running Oxide versions earlier than 22.x must update to 22.x before updating to 23.1.
Mitigations
Oxide recommends updating rather than relying on mitigation.
If you terminate or inspect traffic to the Oxide rack, restrict access to the
/ endpoint to trusted users, if possible, until you have
updated to version 23.x. Restricting access to this endpoint will prevent users from logging in to
the silo.
Technical Background
libxslt CVE-2025-7424
Nexus, the Oxide control plane, uses the samael
Rust crate during the processing of SAML responses. samael links to the xmlsec
library for various operations like signature validation. This is a C library that further links to
libxml2 and libxslt; Helios ships with version 1.1.42 of libxslt, which is vulnerable to
CVE-2025-7424, a type confusion issue while applying XML transformations which can lead to a denial
of service or memory corruption.
An attacker can craft a SAML response containing transforms within a ds:Transform section under the
ds:Signature block of either the entire SAML response or the assertion, which is passed from Nexus
to samael and eventually to libxml2, which processes any XSLT transforms using libxslt and is
therefore vulnerable.
In addition to the denial of service vector, Oxide is aware that this could allow an attacker to read arbitrary memory addresses available to Nexus. It is possible that this could lead to arbitrary code execution but we have not identified a working attack chain.
The SAML response must contain the correct issuer configured for the silo, but the error response generated by Nexus when the issuer is incorrect contains the correct issuer, so no information about silo configuration is necessary other than the silo name.
Oxide software version 23.1 fixes this issue by updating libxslt to version 1.1.45. It also restricts the allowed set of transforms to those specified in the SAML core 2.0 specification (section 5.4.4, “Transforms”), which does not contain XSLT transformations. This change has been backported to 22.2 as well.
libxmlsec server-side request forgery
Nexus uses the samael Rust crate during the processing of SAML responses. samael links to the xmlsec
library for various operations like signature validation. This is a C library that further links to
libxml2. When HTTP support is enabled in libxml2, xmlsec will follow HTTP URI references found in
ds:Reference nodes. An attacker can craft a SAML response containing a ds:Reference that has a URI
pointing to an arbitrary URL, and Nexus will perform a GET to that address.
Oxide software version 23.1 (or 22.2) fixes the issue by updating libxml2 to version 2.15.4,
which removes HTTP support entirely in the library. It also restricts ds:Reference URIs to only
contain in-document references, following what is specified in the SAML core 2.0 specification
(section 5.4.2, “References”).
SSRF using this vector is not reliable due to a separate issue. Prior to Oxide software version 23.1 (or 22.2), in Helios (the illumos-based host operating system on each sled), libxml2 was built without _REENTRANT set. This causes errno within libxml2 to be flooded by syscalls performed in other Nexus threads. If a connect call in libxml2 would have ordinarily returned with an EINPROGRESS or EWOULDBLOCK error, the errno visible to the library would likely be different due to other work Nexus is performing; this causes libxml2 to close the socket and return an error.
Because the content of the GET response, if successful, is not returned to the user, Oxide is not aware of any possible attacks this could enable. GET requests are not used to modify system state in any Oxide-developed HTTP APIs. The only non-Oxide-developed HTTP API on the underlay network is ClickHouse, which does not allow modifying data using GET requests.